Rockwell Automation Stratix 5100
All information products included in http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov are provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within. DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service, referenced in this product or otherwise. Further dissemination of this product is governed by the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) marking in the header. For more information about TLP, see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp/.
CVSS v3 6.9
ATTENTION: Public exploits are available.
Vendor: Rockwell Automation
Equipment: Stratix 5100 Wireless Access Point/Workgroup Bridge
Vulnerability: Reusing a nonce
Rockwell Automation reports that the vulnerability affects the following wireless access point/ workgroup bridge products:
- Stratix 5100 Version 15.3(3)JC1 and earlier.
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow the attacker to operate as a “man-in-the-middle” between the device and the wireless network.
Rockwell Automation recommends that all users patch the clients that connect to the Stratix 5100 WAP/WGB, and recommends contacting your supplier to get the most updated patch that is compatible with your client devices. However, patching the client only protects the connection formed by that specific client. In order to protect all future clients that may be added to your system, Rockwell Automation recommends patching the Stratix 5100 WAP/WGB when the firmware is available.
As new versions of firmware are released to remediate this vulnerability, Rockwell Automation will provide mitigation updates in their advisory. For more information about these vulnerabilities, mitigation updates, and Rockwell Automation’s general security guidelines, please see Rockwell Automation’s security advisory found at the following link. A login is required to view the advisory.
Rockwell Automation also offers the following general security guidelines:
- Use trusted software, software patches, anti-virus/anti-malware programs, and interact only with trusted web sites and attachments.
- Block all traffic to EtherNet/IP or other CIP protocol-based devices from outside the Manufacturing Zone by blocking or restricting access to TCP and UDP Port 2222 and Port 44818 using proper network infrastructure controls, such as firewalls, Unified Threat Management (UTM) devices, or other security appliances. For more information on TCP/UDP ports used by Rockwell Automation Products, see Knowledge base Article ID 898270.
- Help minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and confirm that they are not accessible from the Internet.
- Locate control system networks and devices behind firewalls, and isolate them from the business network.
- When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize that a VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
NCCIC/ICS-CERT reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
ICS-CERT also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS-CERT web page. Several recommended practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available in the ICS‑CERT Technical Information Paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies, that is available for download from the ICS-CERT web site.
Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their established internal procedures and report their findings to ICS-CERT for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
This vulnerability is not remotely exploitable. High skill level is needed to exploit.
Key Reinstallation Attacks (“KRACK”) work against the four-way handshake of the WPA2 protocol. KRACK takes advantage of the retransmission of a handshake message to prompt the installation of the same encryption key every time it receives Message 3 from the access point. Retransmission of the handshake message from the access point occurs if a proper client acknowledgement is not received to the initial message; retransmission resets the nonce value and replay counter to their initial values. A malicious actor could force these nonce resets by replaying the appropriate handshake message, which could allow for injection and decryption of arbitrary packets, hijacking of TCP connections, injection of HTTP content, or replaying of unicast or multicast data frames on the targeted device.
Mathy Vanhoef, of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium discovered this vulnerability.
Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Critical Manufacturing, Energy, Water and Wastewater Systems
Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide
Company Headquarters Location: Wisconsin
For any questions related to this report, please contact the NCCIC at:
Toll Free: 1-888-282-0870
The NCCIC continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by choosing one of the links below to provide feedback about this product.