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U.S. Department of Homeland Security Seal. ICS-CERT. Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team.

Advisory (ICSA-15-265-02)

IBC Solar ServeMaster Source Code Vulnerability

Original release date: September 22, 2015 | Last revised: August 27, 2018

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Independent researcher Maxim Rupp has identified three vulnerabilities in IBC Solar products. The vulnerabilities are disclosure of applications source code, plain text passwords, and cross site scripting. IBC Solar has not produced a patch to mitigate these vulnerabilities.

These vulnerabilities could be exploited remotely.


The following are affected:

  • IBC Solar ServeMaster TLP+, and
  • Danfoss TLX Pro+.


Exploitation of the vulnerabilities can cause an attacker to get the source code of executable scripts, view passwords in plain text, and the ability to inject malicious code.

Impact to individual organizations depends on many factors that are unique to each organization. NCCIC/ICS-CERT recommends that organizations evaluate the impact of these vulnerabilities based on their operational environment, architecture, and product implementation.


IBC Solar is a Germany-based photovoltaics specialist, offering solutions for sunlight-generated power. IBC Solar maintains offices in several countries around the world, including the UK, Netherlands, Italy, India, France, Czech Republic, China, Japan, Portugal Austria, Romania, Malaysia, Turkey, Spain, and Poland.

The affected products, ServeMaster TLP+ and Danfoss TLX Pro+, are web-based SCADA systems. According to IBC Solar, ServeMaster TLP+ and Danfoss TLX Pro+ are deployed across the Energy sector. IBC Solar estimates that these products are used primarily in Europe and Asia.




Because of incorrect settings of the interpreter, the attacker can get the source code of executable scripts.

CVE-2015-6469b has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 7.5 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N).c


At viewing the page source for attacker is able to view passwords in plain text.

CVE-2015-6474e has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v2 base score of 9.1 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).f


In this application, there are an infinite number of XSS.

CVE-2015-6475h has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 9.8 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).i



These vulnerabilities could be exploited remotely.


No known public exploits specifically target these vulnerabilities.


Crafting a working exploit for these vulnerabilities would not be difficult. An attacker with a low skill would be able to exploit these vulnerabilities.



Upgrade to a source that prevents disclosure of source code.


Upgrade to a source that does not store passwords in plaintext.


Input validation: Never insert untrusted data except in allowed location.

Additional steps are available in the pdf available from the NSA at: https://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/factsheets/xss_iad_factsheet_final_web.pdf

ICS-CERT recommends that users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Specifically, users should:

  • Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet.
  • Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls, and isolate them from the business network.
  • When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize that VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.

ICS-CERT reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

ICS-CERT also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS-CERT web page at: http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/content/recommended-practices. Several recommended practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available in the ICS‑CERT Technical Information Paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies, that is available for download from the ICS-CERT web site (http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/).

Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their established internal procedures and report their findings to ICS-CERT for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

Contact Information

For any questions related to this report, please contact the NCCIC at:

Toll Free: 1-888-282-0870

For industrial control systems cybersecurity information:  http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov 
or incident reporting:  https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Report-Incident?

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